Terrorism and Latin-American Stocks Markets by Magner, Nicolás S. & Roa, Cinthia K.
Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas Nueva Época
Volumen 14 Primer Número Especial Aniversario, Agosto 2019, pp. 583-599
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21919/remef.v14i0.424
Terrorism and Latin-American Stocks Markets
Nicolás S. Magner1
Universidad Finis Terrae , Chile
Cinthia K. Roa2
Universidad Finis Terrae, Chile
(Recepción: 22/marzo/2019, aceptado: 28/junio/2019)
Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of major terrorist attacks of the last 20 years on a
set of stocks listed at Latin-American stock markets. Utilizing the capital market model,
we calculate abnormal returns during the day of the terror attacks for 115 stocks listed
in 6 Latin-American countries. In this sense, we appreciate different reaction between
countries, where Brazil, Peru, and Chile have a significant market reaction of terrorism.
These results promote international diversification and the use of this loss to avoid signi-
ficant capital losses. However, the results are limited by the validity of the capital market
model. This paper has important implications for international investors and their in-
vestment risk management strategies. Despite the frequency of terrorist events, this is
the first work that addresses a wide range of these in Latin American countries. The
main conclusion is that there is a negative effect of terrorist events on Latin American
markets, but this effect is mixed; there is a negative and significant impact of the US
terrorist attacks and a weak and non-significant effect when the attacks occur outside
the US.
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Terrorismo y mercados bursátiles latinoamericanos
Resumen
Este artículo investiga los efectos de los grandes ataques terroristas de los últimos 20
años en un conjunto de acciones que cotizan en los mercados bursátiles latinoamericanos.
Utilizando el modelo de mercado de capitales, calculamos rendimientos anormales durante
el día de los ataques terroristas para 115 acciones que cotizan en 6 países de América
Latina. En este sentido, apreciamos diferentes reacciones entre países, donde Brasil, Perú
y Chile tienen una reacción significativa del terrorismo en el mercado. Estos resultados
promueven la diversificación internacional y el uso de esta pérdida para evitar pérdidas
significativas de capital. Sin embargo, los resultados están limitados por la validez del
modelo de mercado de capitales. Este documento tiene importantes implicaciones para
los inversores internacionales y sus estrategias de gestión de riesgos de inversión. A pesar
de la frecuencia de los eventos terroristas, este es el primer trabajo que aborda una amplia
gama de estos en los países de América Latina. La principal conclusión es que hay un
efecto negativo de los acontecimientos terroristas en los mercados latinoamericanos, pero
este efecto es mixto; hay un impacto negativo y significativo de los ataques terroristas
estadounidenses y un efecto débil y no significativo cuando los ataques ocurren fuera de
los Estados Unidos.
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1. Introduction
Terrorism has several adverse economic and financial effects such as a reduction in the
physical capital, increased costs of financial and other counter-terrorism regulations, da-
mage of critical infrastructure (power plants, nuclear facilities, chemical factories, bridges,
pipelines and water supply), increased economic instability, destruction of market infras-
tructure and operations and a decrease in investor confidence (Chesney, Reshetar, &
Karaman, 2011)
Enders, Sandler, & Gaibulloev (2011) define Terrorism as “a premeditated use or threat
to use violence by individuals or subnational groups against noncombatants to obtain a
political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the
immediate victims”. This intimidation, together with the destruction of assets, economic
growth, and life perception reduction, generate effects in the financial markets. In this
regard, Abadie & Gardeazabal (2008) observe a depression in growth of 10% of the Basque
country during the 1998- 2000 period, similar to what was found by (Karolyi & Martell,
2010), who indicate that every terrorist event generates, on average, a negative reaction
of a -0.83% in prices of public companies. In the same line, (Drakos, 2004) observes
structural changes in the systematic risk (beta) in the airline business after 9/11.
A terrorist event should affect the price of public companies according to the present
value theory Campbell & Shiller (1987), which indicates that the price of an asset de-
pends on the expected cash flow and risk. In this regard, (Drakos & Kutan, 2003) show
that a terrorist event affect the cash flow of a company in various forms; diminishes fo-
reign investment, the demand for tourism services and as a consequence, the aggregated
demand of the local economy, as well as increasing the risks for business, as the insu-
rance companies exclude from their insurances losses generated by terrorist events. In
consequence, beyond the actual terror caused by terrorism, it is reasonable to think that
investors would adjust their perceptions of value in front of a specific event, which should
motivate them to make investment decisions that affect the prices of public companies.
For this, we should expect to see effects from terrorist attacks of global relevance in
Latin-American stocks markets even when these have occurred beyond its borders, as
these attacks affect the local economy negatively undermining their growth, investments,
and trade, this being relevant for companies in Latin America in regards to economic
conglomerates located in the USA, Europe, and Asia. Table 1 shows the total trade
of Latin-American countries with the main economics clusters. Chile stands out as an
economy with high exposition to international trade (over 35% of the GDP), where 40%
of its total trade is concentrated in the East, Asia, and Pacific. Similar situation, although
more intense is the one in Mexico, which focuses 65% of its total trade in the USA, that
represents 47% of the GPD.
Table 1 shows the percentage of the total trade of the studied Latin American countries
compared to three areas of the world for 2017. Column 1 shows the countries studied;
columns 2, 3 and 4 indicate the three continents/areas where terrorist attacks took place;
column (a) shows the total trade of each country in the East Asia & Pacific area against
their gross domestic product (GDP); column (b) represents the total trade of each country
in the East Asia & Pacific area against their total trade with all the world, column (c)
shows the total trade of each country in the Europe & Central Asia area compared
to their gross domestic product (GDP), column (d) represents the total trade of each
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country in the Europe & Central Asia area in relation to their total trade with all the
world, columns (e) y (f) show the total trade of each country in relation to its GDP and
the world respectively, in the North America area.
Table 1. Statistics for total trade for countries in the sample
East Asia &amp; Pacific (2) Europe &amp;amp; Central Asia (3) North America (4)
Country (1) % Total tradeof GDP (a)
% Total trade
of world trade
(b)
% Total trade
of GDP
(c)
% Total trade in
relation to the
world (d)
% Total
trade of
GDP (e)
% Total trade in
relation to the
world (f)
Chile 19,49% 40,2% 7,54% 15,6% 8,62% 17,8%
Mexico 13,2% 18,3% 6,8% 9,4% 47,2% 65,5%
Peru 14,0% 35,2% 6,9% 17,3% 8,0% 20,1%
Brazil 5,64% 31,48% 3,90% 21,76% 2,76% 15,40%
Argentina 4,5% 23,1% 3,7% 18,9% 2,2% 11,3%
Colombia 5,15% 19,3% 4,86% 18,2% 7,77% 29,1%
Source: Worldbank official webpage, 2019
A second argument for thinking that terrorist events should significantly affect the
Latin-American stock markets is the contagion phenomenon. The technological progress,
the rising in foreign investment, and the need to diversify investments has increased the
contagion risk of negative shocks. Table 2 shows the 13 terrorist events with the highest
impact since the attack on the twin towers of 2001, and its effect over the stock indexes,
although in different magnitudes. For instance, the terrorist attacks in the United States
led to the most significant stock market crashes, along with an active trading connection
between Latin American economies and the United States.
The Table 2 shows the variation observed in the price of the main stock indexes of each
country the day of the event in relation to the closing price of the day before. Each row
represents the 13 events studied, in the last row the percentage of events with negative
returns can be observed. *For the case of Colombia, the effects are studied starting event
6, as there is no data of stock indexed for previous attacks.
Table 2. Latin-American stock indexes returns on the day of the attack
Events Chile Mexico Peru Brazil Argentina Colombia*
Twin towers -2,80% -5,6% -3,60% -9% -7,70%
Bali attacks -0,46% 0,34% 0,14% -4,56% 2,94%
Madrid bombing -1,06% -2,5% 0,6% -4,2% -0,25%
School in Beslan 0,30% 0,64% -0,27% -1,28% 1,10%
London bombing -0,26% 0,44% -0,27% -0,27% 2,57%
Bombay shooting 0,32% 3,77% 2,75% 4,76% 5,34% 0,54%
Norway attack 0,21% 0,56% -0,52% 0,01% -0,31% 1,51%
Boston bombing -2,30% -2,32% -4,11% -3,66% -1,74% -0,99%
Charlie Hebdo attack 0,00% 1,17% -0,35% 3,05% 2,34% 1,03%
Paris shooting -0,40% -1,14% -0,73% -0,78% 0,01% 0,60%
Orlando massive shooting -0,34% -0,55% -1,12% 0,48% -1,13% 0,56%
Manchester Stadium attack 0,19% -0,25% 0,03% -1,54% -0,53% 0,79%
Strasbourg shooting 0,73% -1,11% 0,22% 0,59% 0,61% -0,49%
% Negative events 53,8% 53,8% 61,5% 61,5% 46,2% 15,4%
A third argument is the co-integration between financial markets. When countries are
economically and financially integrated, generate a strong correlation, and co-integration
in their stock markets (Donadelli & Paradiso, 2014). As a consequence, investors decrease
their diversification opportunities and enhance the contagion effect between countries
and a higher country risk before a worldwide crisis (Gagnon, Power, & Toupin, 2016).
In this regard, Hardy, Magner, Lavin, Cardenas, & Jara-Bertin (2018) find evidence of
co-integration between MILA markets when co-integration tests are applied that extend
the results delivered by Mellado & Escobari (2015) and Sandoval & Soto (2016).
Despite these conceptual arguments that lead to expect significant effects of terrorist
events over the Latin- American stock markets, other might explain the absence of such
an impact. The main one is related to their low stock market efficiency or poor reaction,
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also named as efficiency market hypothesis. A study of the Mexican Stock Market Bhat-
tacharya, Daouk, Jorgenson, & Kehr (2000) find evidence of reduced efficiency, observed
through a weak reaction of the stock prices before relevant events. There are four expla-
nations for this phenomenon: (a) the stock market is informationally inefficient; (b) news
are not relevant to determine the value of the company; (c) news are entirely anticipa-
ted for the market and; (d) the market has an active presence of insider traders. In the
same line Hardy et, al., (2018) find evidence that, even after the MILA integration of
four important Latin American stock markets (Chile, Colombia, Perú y México), market
efficiency is weak because relevant events not generate a reaction of prices.
In this way, our motivation in this paper is to study the effect of a terrorist attack in
the main Latin-American stock markets. We think that this is important for two reasons.
First, because the majority of the studies focus on the impact of a terrorist attack on
the local economy, while a few papers about the indirect effect on other countries, not
considering the existence of a global impact and limiting the possibilities of investment
risk management through international diversification. Second, literature is focused on
the reaction of developed stock markets, while small fraction studies emerging markets
and, to the best of our knowledge, absent to Latin-America, even when Arin, Ciferri, &
Spagnolo (2008) find that the adverse effect of terrorism is more significant in emerging
countries.
To achieve our purpose, we selected six Latin-American Stock markets and collected
the returns of stocks with transactions between the 2000- 2018 period. Then, we choose
13 terrorist attacks in areas with a strong relation with Latin-America, and we imple-
ment an event study methodology based on the capital asset market model. Finally, we
estimate the terrorism impact with the statistical significance of the cumulative abnormal
returns for two days before the attack. For management autocorrelation, multicollinearity
and heteroscedasticity problems in our expected generation market model (market model
OLS, see section 3.2), we include eight statistical tests, five parametric tests, and three
nonparametric tests (see section 3.3 for obtaining a detailed explanation). We believe that
with this strategy, we can work with the OLS residues obtained by those that present
typical problems in their specifications.
The result indicates a weak reaction of the Latin-American stock markets except
for US terrorist attacks. For example, during the 9/11 attack, the markets experienced
6,1% of cumulative abnormal returns. Contrary to this, during the London attack, the
cumulative abnormal return was 1% positive although with little statistical significance.
But the strength of the impact change over the stock markets. In this sense, Brazil is the
stock market with the most negative reaction, while Argentina presents a positive one.
The results also change between sectors when the most sensitive sectors are energy and
industry.
We think that these results have many practical implications oriented to improve the
understanding of a new type of catastrophic risk that investors and financial markets must
face, quantify and manage. For example, an investor could consider investing their money
in Argentina, Colombia, or Mexico in time of terrorism, or increase their exposition in
sectors out of energy or industrial sectors.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we present evidence that
shows the effect of terrorist attacks. In section 3 we describe the database and methodo-
logy. In section 4 we present results. Finally, in section 5 we conclude.
2. Terrorism and financial markets
The effects of terrorism in the financial markets have been widely documented (see a sur-
vey in Kollias, Kyrtsou, & Papadamou (2013)). However, only a few catch the attention in
the literature, especially the 9/11 attacks of 2001 in the United States. Terrorist attacks
have been a dark side of Latin American history since the ’70s. However, following the
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9/11 attacks, these events have concentrated in the Middle East, since the invasion of
Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and they account for more than 3.000 deaths, be-
sides from the ones in the United States and Europe (Global Terrorism Database, 2019).
In fact, since the 9/11 attacks, terrorist events have not only been a concern in terms of
safety or fear, but also for their impacts on the economy. In this regard, (Goel, Cagle, &
Shawky, 2017) calculate that the economic impact of terrorism is measured in billions of
dollars annually, with the most in 2014 at 52.9 billion.
The psychosocial nature of the markets explain the adverse financial effects of the
terrorist attacks, where investors see a negative impact in the valuation for the panic ge-
nerated by terrorism (Hirshleifer, 2001; Boubaker, Farag & Nguyen, 2015). In this sense,
and despite the critical argument of the physical losses of assets, Johnston and Nede-
lescu (2005) evidence that the financial markets are not only confronted with significant
disruptions caused by the massive damage to property and communication systems, but
also by the high levels of uncertainty and market volatility. Complementary, Nikkinen,
Omran, Sahlstrom & Aijo (2006) say that technological progress causes severe reactions
in front of news that may threaten the future of their investments.
From this perspective, Drakos (2010) suggests that terrorist attacks lead to signifi-
cantly lower returns on the day a terrorist attack occurs. However, there is no complete
consensus on the literature. In this regard, Kollias et al., (2013) found opposite results. For
instance, following the Madrid terrorist attack, abnormal returns can be verified in most
sectors of Spain, while in the London attacks these effects are not statistically significant.
Concerning the duration of the effects, it is possible to classify between temporary
effects, those that occurred within the following days to the attack, and long term effects,
those that are related to changes in the systematic risk. Drakos (2004) observes that
following the 9/11 attacks in the USA companies from the airline’s sector suffered high
losses in the stock prices and changed their relationship with the stock index significantly
increasing their beta. In contrast, Kollias et al., (2013) studied the reaction of public
companies of the Spain and UK and observed negative effects on the first days following
the Madrid and London attacks, respectively, although said effects disappeared after a
few days.
The effect on the stock markets is not constant through all the sectors. More specifi-
cally, Chesney et al., (2011) find that airline, travel, tourism, accommodation, restaurant,
postal and insurance industries are particularly susceptible to increased terrorism risks
and, in consequence, economies with more concentration for these industries hurt most
from falls in output and employment.
3. Latin-American security market daily returns
3.1 Data
The dataset employed in our analysis consists of the daily closing prices for 115 stocks3
covering the 2001 – 2018 period (See table 3). Then, we consider 13 terrorist attacks with
global communicational effects outside Latin-America (see table 4).
The Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics by country including: Numbers of com-
panies considered in the study for each country; Average abnormal return (AAR) for the
event window; Standard deviation of the abnormal returns; Average of abnormal cumula-
tive return(CAR); Standard deviation of average abnormal cumulative return; Standard
deviation of average abnormal cumulative return on absolute value; and percentage of
zero returns for each country that has the database, on average, the days that price of
companies registered non trading.
3We work with index stocks and eliminated stocks with more than 20% cero returns
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Table 3. Descriptive statistic
Statistics Chile Mexico Peru Brazil Argentina Colombia Total
Number of companies 29 22 21 28 8 7 115
Average abnormal return (AAR) -0,12% -0,23% 0,01% 0,10% 0,35% -1,01% -0,15%
Standard deviation AAR 1,49% 2,66% 2,40% 2,43% 1,85% 2,20% 2,17%
Average CAR -0,23% -0,22% 0,03% -0,15% 0,30% -1,25% -0,25%
Standard deviation CAR 2,43% 3,49% 3,57% 4,07% 3,83% 3,70% 3,52%
Absolute CAR 1,72% 2,25% 2,41% 2,67% 2,71% 2,93% 2,45%
Standard deviation CAR absolute 1,76% 2,73% 2,68% 3,08% 2,73% 2,72% 2,62%
Percentage of Zero returns 19,24% 12,87% 4,20% 13,22% 21,93% 20,79% 15,38%
The following table shows the 13 events considered in this investigation. Columns 1
and 2 show the number and name of the event; columns 3 and 4 show the location of
the event, country, and continent, respectively; column 5 shows the date of the terrorist
attack.
Table 4. Detail of studied events
Number of event Event Country Continent Date
1 Twin towers United States America 11-09-2019
2 Bali attacks Indonesia Asia 12-10-2002
3 Madrid bombing Spain Europe 11-03-2004
4 School in Beslan Russia Europe 01-09-2004
5 London bombing England Europe 07-07-2005
6 Bombay shooting India Asia 26-11-2008
7 Norway attack Norway Europe 22-07-2011
8 Boston bombing United States America 15-04-2013
9 Charlie Hebdo attack France Europe 07-01-2015
10 Paris shooting France Europe 13-11-2015
11 Orlando massive shooting United States America 13-06-2016
12 Manchester Stadium attack England Europe 22-05-2017
13 Strasbourg shooting France Europe 11-12-2018
3.2 Event study methodology
The event study methodology (See MacKinlay (1997) for a survey and Corrado (2011)
for a good update and recommendations) has two stages: abnormal returns estimation
process and event study test statistics for abnormal returns. Since Fama, Fisher Jensen,
& Roll (1969), abnormal (excess of) return is typically calculated from the market model
(especially in the daily analysis). In this sense, ARi,h is the abnormal return of a security h
on day i, Ri,h is the realized return and RMi,h is the market index4. As the market model
is a linear regression (estimated by OLS), the parameters αi and βi are the intercept and
slope estimates, respectively.
ARi,h = Ri,h − (αi + βii,h) (1)
Let h = 0 denote the day of a hypothetical event for a specific security. Besides, a 200-
day estimation period is required; therefore, the event window is defined as h ∈ (0;−2)
for each event date and security combination.
Also, n denotes the length of the event window and m the sample size. We define
AARni as the average abnormal return and PE(AARni) its prediction standard error as
in Salinger (1992):
PE (AARni) =
σmi√
ni
∗
√
1 +
ni
mi
+ ni ∗ (ARMni −ARMmi)
2∑
h (RMi,h −ARMmi)2
(2)
4We use the most important index for each country. IPSA, Chile; IGBC, Colombia; BOVENPA; Brazil;
IPC, Mexico; S&P/BVL, Peru; MERVAL, Argentina.
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Here, ARMmi represents the average return of the market index for the estimation
window and σmi the standard error from the estimation window regression. Under a null
hypothesis of no abnormal return, AARni
PE(AARni)
is distributed t-Student withmi−2 degrees
of freedom (assuming identical, independent and normally distributed data).
3.3. Event study tests
For this research, we applied parametric and nonparametric tests. We included more tests
because the standard event study tests cannot be used correctly in Latin-American stocks
markets with a higher degree of variability in liquidity and return distributions, until an
empirical specification study. Kearney (2012) present that emerging stock markets are
significantly less informationally efficient than their developed counterparts. He explain
that their limited transparency, scarce corporate information, weak regulation, low audi-
ting standards, lax disclosure requirements, dominant players who can move prices away
from intrinsic values, incompletely developed “culture(s) of equity” that reduce the reac-
tion times of market participants to new information, and the resulting illiquidity that
impedes the market’s ability to accommodate orders.
3.3.1. Parametric tests
a. T-test
The t-test is the simplest statistic test uses for single firms in each time point t.
Ttest ARi,t =
ARi,t
SARi
, Ttest CAR =
CARi
SCAR
(3)
Where SARi is the standard deviation of the abnormal returns in the window. Then, we
calculate the statistics of the accumulated abnormal returns (CAR) for each company.
b. Patell t-test (Patell, 1976)
TPatell =
1√
N
∗
∑
(
√
ni ∗ AARni
PE (AARni)
) (4)
Under the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns, TPatell must theoretically distribute
t-student with N degrees of freedom, thus, asymptotically as standard normal.
c. Boehmer test (Boehmer et al., 1991)
The Boehmer test of standardized residuals corrected for event-induced changes in
volatility. This test is similar to the Patell t-test, but it considers an adjustment due
to induced volatility in the cross-sectional event window.
TBoehmer =
∑√
ni ∗ AARniPE(AARni)√
N ∗ σ2(√n ∗ AARnPE(AARn) )
(5)
Where
σ2
(√
n ∗ AARn
PE (AARn)
)
=
1
N − 1∗
∑
(
√
ni ∗ AARni
PE (AARni)
− 1
N
∗
∑√
ni ∗ AARni
PE (AARni)
)
2
(6)
The TAdjusted distributes asymptotically under the null hypothesis of no abnormal
return as standard normal
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d. Adjusted standardized Cross-section test (Kolari and Pynnon, 2010)
The Kolari test of standardized residuals corrected for event-induced changes in vola-
tility and cross-correlation. This test proposes a modification to the Boehmer-test to
account for cross-correlation of the abnormal returns. The context of this investigation
is important because the events are on the same dates for all the stocks in the market.
The correlation between financial stocks is a stylized fact in the literature, and it is
important to leave out that the results are dragged by correlations between assets. We
use the standardized abnormal returns and defining r as the average of the sample
cross-correlation of the estimation period abnormal returns.
TKolari = TBoehmer
√
1− r¯
1 + (N − 1) r¯ (7)
e. Crude dependence (Brown and Warner et al., 1980, 1985)
CDA is a parametric test, which measures if the average abnormal return time series
during the event was statistically different from that of the estimation window. To
execute it, a single variance estimate for the entire sample is assumed, so the test does
not account for the unequal return variances across securities. In 1985, Brown and
Warner suggested that the standard deviation of average residuals should be estima-
ted from the time series of the average abnormal returns over the estimation period.
The advantage from CDA is that it avoids the potential problem of cross-sectional
correlation of security return.
S2AAR =
1
M − 2
T1∑
t= T0
(AARt − ¯AAR)2 (8)
¯AAR =
1
M
T1∑
t= T0
AARt (9)
TCDA =
√
N
AARt
SAAR
(10)
3.3.2 Non-parametric test
a. Rank test (Corrado, 1989)
The Corrado test is a non-parametric test which considers the ranks of abnormal
returns (an adaptation of the popular rank test). Let’s consider Rank(ARi,h) as the
rank of the abnormal return in the complete sample (estimation window and event
window). Then, under the null hypothesis, each rank is a uniform random drawing of
integers from 1 through the complete sample. The Corrado statistic is calculated as
follows:
TRank =
1√
N
N∑
i=1
(
∑
h∈ni Rank (ARi,h)− ni ∗
(
ni+mi+1
2
)
)√
ni ∗mi ∗ ni+mi+112
(11)
b. Adjust Rank Test (Corrado and Zivney, 1992)
The Corrado and Zivney rank test corrected for event-induced volatility of rankings.
For cumulative (average) abnormal returns, the aggregation formula in Cowan (1992, p.
346) is applied. For this, it is necessary to define the Rank (SARi,h) as the new ranking
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of the abnormal returns considering the complete sample, that is, for the estimation
window and the event window.
SARi,h = ARi,h si h ∈ mi (12)
SARi,h =
ARi,h√
σ2(
√
n ∗ AARnPE(AARn) )
si h ∈ ni (13)
TRank Adjust∗ =
1√
N
N∑
i=1
(
∑
h∈ni Rank (SARi,h)− ni ∗
(
ni+mi+1
2
)
)√
ni ∗mi ∗ ni+mi+112
(14)
c. Sign test
The main issue in the sign test is the non-symmetric distribution of abnormal returns
(Brown and Warner, 1985). In emerging markets, large skewness values are expected.
We consider Sign(ARi,h − xi) the sign of the difference between the abnormal return
and a specific value of x. In addition, we consider p as the proportion of positive signs
in the estimation window for each security.
pi =
1
mi
∗
∑
h∈mi
Sign(ARi,h − xi) (15)
where
Sign(ARi,h − xi) = 1 if ARi,h > xi and Sign(ARi,h − xi) = 0 otherwise
As evaluated in Cowan (1992), the first generalization of the sign test establishes xi = 0
(by using the mean of abnormal returns for the estimation period, which by construc-
tion, is zero for the market model). In this sense, pi is the proportion of abnormal
returns greater than 0.
TSign =
1√
N
∗
N∑
i=1
(
∑
h∈ni
Sign (ARi,h − xi)− ni ∗ pi)/(
√
ni ∗ pi ∗ (1− pi) (16)
4. LATAM stock market reaction and terrorist attacks
To research the effect of terrorism in Latin-American stocks markets, we calculate CAAR
for 115 companies in the day of the terrorist attack and the next two days. To expand our
results, we repeated this process for 13 international terrorist attacks and applied eight
parametric and non-parametric test to determine the stock market reaction. Additionally,
we estimate the overall all our results using a GARCH(1,1) model for generating non-
normal returns to evaluate the dependence of the non-normal generating model (Bacmann
and Dubois (2003) for a survey). Table 5 indicates that the most critical event for LATAM
stock markets was the 9/11 terrorist attack (CAAR: - 6,1%). Besides the magnitude, this
event caused a significant reaction in all markets, independent of the test applied. We
observe a similar effect in the Boston attack, evidence of the strong dependence between
US and LATAM stock markets. Appendix 2 shows the same results but generate with a
GARCH(1,1) model. In this sense, the events with more significance are 9/11 attack and
attack in Boston, but the attack in Bombay are significant too.
592
REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance)
Terrorism and Latin-American Stocks Markets
Table 5. T-statistics by event
9/11 attack Attack inBali
Attack in
Madrid Attack in Russia
Attack in
London
Attack in
Bombay
Attack in
Norway
CAAR -0,061 -0,009 -0,013 0,008 0,010 0,037 -0,010
T Test -13,420 -1,480 -2,968 2,038 0,728 7,473 -3,298
CDA Test -5,231 -0,708 -1,318 0,641 0,612 1,240 -0,797
Patell Test -21,755 -3,253 -8,451 3,427 3,618 9,961 -4,443
Boehmer Test -11,491 -2,455 -6,678 2,471 3,542 5,716 -3,345
Kolari Test -3,932 -0,804 -2,229 0,687 1,072 0,777 -0,724
Rank Test -3,484 -0,759 -2,324 0,255 0,811 1,445 -1,021
Rank Test
Adjusted -3,326 -0,940 -2,176 0,416 0,905 1,402 -1,006
Sign Test -5,535 0,133 -3,503 0,646 3,121 6,692 -3,383
Attack in
Boston
Charlie Hebdo
attack
Attack in
Paris
Attack in
Orlando
Attack in
Manchester
Attack in
Strasbourg
CAAR -0,031 0,005 -0,013 -0,004 0,008 0,010
T Test -11,368 1,547 -3,713 -0,965 0,603 3,184
CDA Test -3,214 0,433 -0,924 -0,238 0,559 0,917
Patell Test -19,062 3,548 -7,084 -2,308 3,466 3,793
Boehmer Test -9,459 2,481 -4,736 -3,043 3,123 3,163
Kolari Test -2,383 0,636 -1,026 -0,636 0,808 0,820
Rank Test -2,009 0,468 -0,842 -0,291 1,062 1,251
Rank Test
Adjusted -1,823 0,410 -0,859 -0,427 1,141 1,277
Sign Test -7,440 2,668 -1,672 -1,863 3,441 3,723
The first row shows the average cumulative abnormal return of the 13 terrorist events
included in the sample; the following rows show the result of each statistical test specified
in the methodology. The grey boxes indicate the statistically significant values to 10%,
where the null hypothesis is rejected.
Table 6 shows the cumulative abnormal returns in the event window between the day of
the terrorist attack and the next two days. On average, we show that the Latin-American
companies react with positives (returns 0,2% on average). However, the direction of the
reaction is different between countries. Mexico, Argentina, and Colombia show a positive
response, while Chile, Peru, and Brazil present an adverse reaction. These results are
similar when we change the non-normal return model. Appendix 3 shows the reaction for
all test by countries using a GARCH (1,1) model. Argentine has the major percentage
of reaction, and Mexico has less percentage. To evaluate the statistical significance, we
applied eight tests. The results are mixed and statistically insignificant. On average, the
percentage of reaction is 15, 6% with a minimum rate of the 4,8% for the sign test, and
29,8% for the Patell test.
Table 6. Percentage of reaction of companies by country and type of test
Chile Mexico Peru Brazil Argentine Colombia Mean
No 29 22 21 28 8 7
CAAR -0,2% 0,2 -0,1 -0,6 2,1 0,03 0,2
T Test 10,3% 4,5% 0,0% 14,3% 37,5% 14,3% 13,5%
CDA Test 10,3% 4,5% 0,0% 14,3% 37,5% 28,6% 15,9%
Patell Test 17,2% 4,5% 28,6% 25,0% 75,0% 28,6% 29,8%
Boehmer Test 6,9% 0,0% 14,3% 14,3% 62,5% 14,3% 18,7%
Kolari Test 3,4% 0,0% 9,5% 9,5% 25,0% 0,0% 7,9%
Rank Test 0,0% 4,5% 9,5% 10,7% 75,0% 0,0% 16,6%
Rank Test
Adjusted 3,4% 4,5% 9,5% 10,7% 75,0% 0,0% 17,2%
Sign Test 6,9% 0,0% 9,5% 0,0% 12,5% 0,0% 4,8%
Mean of reaction 7,3% 2,8% 10,1% 12,4% 50,0% 10,7% 15,6%
Table 6 shows the percentage of companies that react to the events, classified by country.
Row (2) indicates the number of people considered by country, row (3) shows the ave-
rage cumulative abnormal return by country; the following rows show the percentage
of companies that react significantly to 10% according to the different statistical tests
described in the methodology. The last row shows the average reaction percentage by
country; likewise, the last column shows the average reaction by statistical test.
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The effects of the terrorist attacks are different between industries. Table 7 shows
CAAR for seven industries according to GICS classification. Sector energy and industry
have the most reaction (17 and 16% of reaction, respectively), while the Materials and
Communication services have the lowest reaction rates (7% of response on average). Howe-
ver, the impact can be changed with the test used. For example, rank test adjusted shows
that sectors consumer discretionary and communication service have the most significant
reaction. The differences within sectors are in line with the literature. Raby (2003) finds
that airline, travel, tourism, accommodation, restaurant, postal, and insurance industries
are particularly susceptible.
For deepen our evidence, and approach the capital market model limitations, we use
a Garch (1,1) method and replicate all our analysis. Appendix 4 shows that energy and
industrial sectors have a high rate of reaction, similar to material and consumer staples
sectors. This test is evidence that the global results do not depend on the non-normal
return generating method.
Table 7 shows the percentage of companies that react to the events, classified by
their respective sectors, according to the Global Industry Classification Standard. Row
(2) indicates the number of companies considered by sector, row (3) shows the average
cumulative abnormal return by sector; the following rows show the percentage of compa-
nies that react significantly to 10% according to the different statistical tests described in
the methodology. The last row shows the average reaction percentage by sector; likewise,
the last column shows the average reaction by statistical test.
Table 7. Percentage of reaction by sector according to the eight types of tests
Energy Material Industrial Consumerdiscretionary
Consumer
staples Financials
Communication
services Mean
CAAR -0,003 -0,0002 -0,009 -0,003 -0,0002 0,005 -0,0008 -0,0016
T Test 6% 3,7% 28,6% 0,0% 18,2% 16,0% 0,0% 10%
CDA Test 6% 3,7% 28,6% 0,0% 18,2% 16,0% 0,0% 10%
Patell Test 39% 22,2% 28,6% 22,2% 18,2% 12,0% 28,6% 24%
Boehmer Test 28% 7,4% 14,3% 11,1% 9,1% 12,0% 0,0% 12%
Kolari Test 11% 3,7% 14,3% 0,0% 9,1% 8,0% 0,0% 7%
Rank Test 17% 7,4% 14,3% 11,1% 4,5% 12,0% 14,3% 11%
Rank Test
Ajusted 17% 7,4% 0,0% 22,2% 9,1% 12,0% 14,3% 12%
Sign Test 11% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 4,5% 8,0% 0,0% 3%
Mean 17% 7% 16% 8% 11% 12% 7% 11%
N 18 27 7 9 22 25 7 115
5. Conclusions
We observe opposite effects of global terrorist attacks in Latin-American stock markets.
In specific, we show a negative and significant impact of the US terrorist attacks and
weak and non-significant effect when the attacks occur outside the US.
This effect varies through different countries and sectors. The most sensible markets
were Brazil, Peru, and Chile, while the most sensitive sectors were energy and communi-
cations.
We have some explanation for this contradictory behavior. The adverse effect of US
terrorist attacks can be understood by the strong correlation between the Latin American
Stock Markets and those located in North America. Another explanation is that investors
adjust their expectations when an attack occurs anticipating a drop in the cash flow of
Latin American companies traded in local markets with economic connection with the
United States. Unfortunately, a limitation of our work is that our methodology does not
allow to distinguish between these explanations.
For the other hand, we explain the poor reaction for the other terrorist attacks with the
low efficiency of Latin American Stocks Markets. Complementary to this, we considerate
that the errors in the statistical tests derived from liquidity problems and abnormal
returns present in emerging markets can justify an insignificant response. As before, our
methodology does not allow us to separate these explanations.
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An application of these results is that the low reaction in Latin American markets
makes them a good diversification option for international investment funds in front of
terrorism, due to their weak response and low probability of a terrorist attack.
We think that study the effect of the terrorist attacks contributes to understanding
better the phenomenon in the financial markets. Their violent, unexpected, sudden, and
viral nature make them an attractive laboratory to evaluate how information influences
financial markets; after all, is difficult to think that markets would not react to terrorist
attack based on explanations related to the use of privileged information (it is not im-
possible, but it is difficult to think that an investor would know of an attack beforehand)
or the lack of attention (the news explode in all media)
An extension of this work is to continue studying in depth the relation between so-
cial phenomena, financial ones, and understand psychosocial variables, such as fear and
terror, and how these influence investment decisions, especially in contexts of emerging
economies where the evidence is scarce.
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Appendix 1. List of stocks companies
Id_Country Country Index Company Industry
1 Chile IPSA Aes Gener Energy
2 Chile IPSA Aguas Andinas Energy
3 Chile IPSA Antar Chile Financials
4 Chile IPSA Banco De Chile Financials
5 Chile IPSA Banco De Credito E Inversion Financials
6 Chile IPSA Banco Santander Chile Financials
7 Chile IPSA Banmedica Consumer Discretionary
8 Chile IPSA Besalco Consumer Discretionary
9 Chile IPSA Cap Materials
10 Chile IPSA Coca-Cola Embonor Series B Pref. Consumer Staples
11 Chile IPSA Colbun Machicura Energy
12 Chile IPSA Compania Cervecerias Unidas Consumer Staples
13 Chile IPSA Compania Sudamericana De Vapores Industrials
14 Chile IPSA Embotelladora Andina Series B Consumer Staples
15 Chile IPSA Enel Generacion Chile Energy
16 Chile IPSA Empresa Nacional De Telecomunicaciones Comunication Services
17 Chile IPSA Empresas Cmpc Materials
18 Chile IPSA Empresas Copec Energy
19 Chile IPSA Enersis Energy
20 Chile IPSA Engie Energia Chile Energy
21 Chile IPSA Gasco Energy
22 Chile IPSA Grupo Security Financials
23 Chile IPSA Latam Airlines Group Industrials
24 Chile IPSA Parque Arauco Financials
25 Chile IPSA Quinenco Industrials
26 Chile IPSA Saci Falabella Consumer Staples
27 Chile IPSA Sociedad Matriz Banco De Chile B Financials
28 Chile IPSA Sociedad Quimica Y Minera De Chile B Pref. Materials
29 Chile IPSA Vina Concha Y Toro Consumer Staples
30 Mexico IPC Alfa ’A’ Industrials
31 Mexico IPC America Movil ’L’ Comunication Services
32 Mexico IPC Cemex Cpo Materials
33 Mexico IPC Consorcio Ara Consumer Discretionary
34 Mexico IPC Corp Int De Entr Consumer Discretionary
35 Mexico IPC Corporacion Geo ’B’ Consumer Discretionary
36 Mexico IPC Empresas Ica Consumer Discretionary
37 Mexico IPC Fomento Economico Mexicano Consumer Staples
38 Mexico IPC Gpo Finance Banorte Financials
39 Mexico IPC Grupo Bimbo ’A’ Consumer Staples
40 Mexico IPC Grupo Carso Series A1 Industrials
41 Mexico IPC Grupo Elektra Financials
42 Mexico IPC Grupo Financiero Inbursa Sries ’O’ Financials
43 Mexico IPC Grupo Kuo ’B’ Materials
44 Mexico IPC Grupo Mexico ’B’ Materials
45 Mexico IPC Grupo Saltillo Materials
46 Mexico IPC Grupo Televisa Comunication Services
47 Mexico IPC Indust Penoles Materials
48 Mexico IPC Kimberly-Clark De Mexico ’A’ Consumer Staples
49 Mexico IPC Organizacion Soriana Consumer Staples
50 Mexico IPC Tv Azteca Comunication Services
51 Mexico IPC Walmart De Mexico ’V’ Consumer Staples
52 Peru IGBVL Pomalca Consumer Staples
53 Peru IGBVL Casa Grande Consumer Staples
54 Peru IGBVL Bco Continental Financials
55 Peru IGBVL Grana Y Montero Consumer Discretionary
56 Peru IGBVL Corporacion Aceros Arequipa ’I’ Materials
57 Peru IGBVL Corporacion Aceros Arequipa Materials
58 Peru IGBVL Alicorp Consumer Staples
59 Peru IGBVL Union Andina De Cementos Materials
60 Peru IGBVL Un.De Cvcs.Prua. Byj.I Consumer Staples
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Id_Country Country Index Company Industry
61 Peru IGBVL Credicorp Financials
62 Peru IGBVL Volcan Compania Minera ’A’ Materials
63 Peru IGBVL Volcan Compania Minera B Pref. Materials
64 Peru IGBVL Ferreyros Saa Consumer Discretionary
65 Peru IGBVL Cementos Pacasmayo Saa Materials
66 Peru IGBVL Luz Del Sur Energy
67 Peru IGBVL Sociedad Minera El Brocal Saa Materials
68 Peru IGBVL Minsur ’I’ Materials
69 Peru IGBVL Cerro Verde Materials
70 Peru IGBVL Southern Copper (Lim) Materials
71 Peru IGBVL Austral Group Consumer Staples
72 Peru IGBVL Edegel Energy
73 Brazil IBOV Ambev On Consumer Staples
74 Brazil IBOV Gerdau Pn Materials
75 Brazil IBOV Metalurgica Gerdau Pn Materials
76 Brazil IBOV Lojas Renner On Consumer Discretionary
77 Brazil IBOV Itau Unibanco Holding Pn Financials
78 Brazil IBOV Lojas Americanas Pn Rep1 Pn Consumer Staples
79 Brazil IBOV Cia Energetica De Minas Gerais Pn Energy
80 Brazil IBOV Brf Brasil Foods On Consumer Staples
81 Brazil IBOV Usinas Siderurgicas De Minas Gerais A Pn Materials
82 Brazil IBOV Engie Brasil Energia On Energy
83 Brazil IBOV Weg On Industrials
84 Brazil IBOV Embraer On Industrials
85 Brazil IBOV Raia Drogasil On Consumer Staples
86 Brazil IBOV Itausa Investimentos Itau Pn Financials
87 Brazil IBOV Banco Do Brasil On Financials
88 Brazil IBOV Vale On Materials
89 Brazil IBOV Petroleo Brasileiro Pn Energy
90 Brazil IBOV Cia Paranaense De Energia Copel Pn Energy
91 Brazil IBOV Braskem Pn Series ’A’ Materials
92 Brazil IBOV Banco Bradesco Pn Financials
93 Brazil IBOV Banco Bradesco On Financials
94 Brazil IBOV Cpad.Sanmt.Basico De Saop.On Energy
95 Brazil IBOV Telefonica Brasil Pn Comunication Services
96 Brazil IBOV Bradespar Pn Financials
97 Brazil IBOV Companhia Siderurgica Nacional On Materials
98 Brazil IBOV Petroleo Brasileiro On Energy
99 Brazil IBOV Cmpbra.De Distb. Pn Consumer Staples
100 Brazil IBOV Tim Participacoes On Comunication Services
101 Argentina IMV Aluar Materials
102 Argentina IMV Banco Macro Bansud ’B’ Financials
103 Argentina IMV Bbva Banco Frances Financials
104 Argentina IMV Gp Finance Galicia ’B’ Financials
105 Argentina IMV Pampa Energia Energy
106 Argentina IMV Sociedad Comercial Del Plata Financials
107 Argentina IMV Telecom Argentina Comunication Services
108 Argentina IMV Ypf Energy
109 Colombia COLCAP Banco De Bogota Financials
110 Colombia COLCAP Bancolombia Financials
111 Colombia COLCAP Cementos Argos Materials
112 Colombia COLCAP Grupo De Inversiones Suramericana Financials
113 Colombia COLCAP Grupo Nutresa Consumer Staples
114 Colombia COLCAP Inversiones Argos Materials
115 Colombia COLCAP Almacenes Exito Consumer Staples
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Appendix 2. T-statistics by event with GARCH(1,1) model.
The first row shows the average cumulative abnormal return of the 13 terrorist events included in the sample; the following rows show the
result of each statistical test specified in the methodology. The grey boxes indicate the statistically significant values to 10%, where the null
hypothesis is rejected.
9/11 attack Attack inBali
Attack in
Madrid
Attack in
Russia
Attack in
London
Attack in
Bombay
Attack in
Norway
CAAR -0,0408 -0,0633 -0,0053 0,0031 0,0115 0,0418 -0,0005
T Test -8,9123 -1,4801 -1,2306 0,8418 0,8305 9,9039 -0,1717
CDA Test -4,1730 -6,3319 -0,6520 0,3065 0,7333 2,5387 -0,0511
Patell Test -18,4365 -1,2424 -5,2343 1,3475 2,4763 6,3232 -2,4355
Boehmer Test -9,3782 -3,2487 -4,7263 3,4852 3,0297 3,3254 -1,2424
Kolari Test -5,2724 -1,0023 -3,8272 2,0395 2,9473 1,2412 -0,7126
Rank Test -2,3591 0,6886 -0,5309 -0,0150 1,2918 2,4663 -0,0731
Rank Test Ajustado -2,8069 -0,5428 -0,5028 0,0575 1,1910 2,1359 -0,1218
Sign Test -5,1461 1,3528 -0,4273 -0,7381 2,9710 6,4568 0,9298
Attack in
Boston
Charlie Hebdo
attack
Attack in
Paris
Attack in
Orlando
Attack in
Manchester
Attack in
Strasbourg
CAAR -0,0188 0,0044 0,0010 -0,0033 0,0015 -0,0004
T Test -6,9516 1,5467 0,3041 -0,8304 0,1070 -0,1205
CDA Test -2,6099 0,5612 0,1023 -0,2881 0,1104 -0,0442
Patell Test -8,2484 2,2874 -5,6440 -1,2837 2,3284 2,3285
Boehmer Test -4,2487 1,5562 -2,2385 -1,2847 4,3584 3,3243
Kolari Test -1,2841 1,2392 -2,3250 -0,9214 0,8237 0,9374
Rank Test -1,4507 0,4941 0,5894 -0,6751 -0,0447 -0,5761
Rank Test Adjusted -1,2312 0,4203 0,3712 -0,7323 0,0346 -0,7320
Sign Test -3,1146 2,0804 1,2561 -1,8924 -0,4364 -1,0850
Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas Nueva Época, Vol. 14 Primer Número Especial
Aniversario, pp. 583-599
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21919/remef.v14i0.424 599
Appendix 3. Percentage of reaction of companies by country and type of test with
GARCH (1,1) model.
Table shows the percentage of companies that react to the events, classified by country.
Row (2) indicates the number of people considered by country, row (3) shows the ave-
rage cumulative abnormal return by country; the following rows show the percentage
of companies that react significantly to 10% according to the different statistical tests
described in the methodology. The last row shows the average reaction percentage by
country; likewise, the last column shows the average reaction by statistical test.
Chile Mexico Peru Brazil Argentina Colombia Mean
CAAR -0,00117 0,001735 -0,00174 -0,02627 0,019715 0,00001 -0,00129
T Test 10% 5% 0% 11% 38% 14% 13%
CDA Test 10% 5% 0% 14% 38% 14% 13%
Patell Test 38% 18% 33% 43% 63% 14% 35%
Boehmer Test 17% 0% 14% 29% 50% 29% 23%
Kolari Test 14% 0% 14% 25% 50% 14% 20%
Rank Test 3% 5% 5% 14% 63% 0% 15%
Rank Test Ajusted 7% 0% 10% 14% 75% 0% 18%
Sign Test 3% 0% 14% 7% 13% 0% 6%
Mean of reaction 13% 4% 11% 20% 48% 11% 18%
Appendix 4. Percentage of reaction by sector according to the eight types of tests
Table 7 shows the percentage of companies that react to the events, classified by their
respective sectors, according to the Global Industry Classification Standard. Row (2)
indicates the number of companies considered by sector, row (3) shows the average cu-
mulative abnormal return by sector; the following rows show the percentage of companies
that react significantly to 10% according to the different statistical tests described in the
methodology. The last row shows the average reaction percentage by sector; likewise, the
last column shows the average reaction by statistical test.
Energy Material Industrial Consumerdiscretionary
Consumer
staples Financials
Communication
services Mean
CAAR -0,0044 0,0001 -0,0090 0,0055 -0,0294 0,0053 -0,0013 -0,0047
T Test 6% 4% 29% 0% 14% 16% 0% 10%
CDA Test 6% 4% 29% 0% 18% 16% 0% 10%
Patell Test 39% 38% 14% 33% 32% 36% 43% 34%
Boehmer Test 33% 23% 0% 11% 9% 24% 0% 14%
Kolari Test 44% 12% 14% 11% 5% 16% 14% 17%
Rank Test 11% 8% 14% 11% 9% 12% 14% 11%
Rank Test
Ajusted 22% 4% 14% 22% 9% 12% 14% 14%
Sign Test 17% 0% 0% 0% 14% 4% 0% 5%
Mean 22% 12% 14% 11% 14% 17% 11% 14%
N 18 27 7 9 22 25 7 115
